Liz and Rebecca explain the final three Supreme Court rulings with huge stakes for true religious freedom. They discuss the Court continued zeal for religious favoritism in the Catholic Charities, Mahmoud, and Skrmetti rulings—further expanding exemptions from the law for religious employers, giving ultra-conservative religious parents veto power over public school curriculum, and upholding state bans gender-affirming care for minors with gender dysphoria.
Cases
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission (2025)
Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025)
United States v. Skrmetti (2025)
Rebecca Markert: Welcome to We Dissent the podcast with secular women attorneys discussing religious liberty issues in our federal and state courts and our work to keep religion and government separate. I'm Rebecca Markert with Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and I'm Liz Cavell with the Freedom From Religion Foundation. It's July and that means it's decision time.
Liz Cavell: Yay.
Rebecca Markert: It also means that it's our birthday month. Liz. Yes, Liz and I were both born in July, but we're not here to talk about that. We're going to talk about the Supreme Court decisions that came down in June. That's
Liz Cavell: Right. Well, decision time just ended. Usually the court wraps it up by the end of June and we delayed this recording a week so that we can make sure we got all the opinions we were watching down and our plan worked. And so we're here to update everyone on all the decisions that came down in the cases that we have covered in the past few months.
Rebecca Markert: As our loyal listeners know, we've been waiting to hear from the court on four cases this past term Last month we intended to preview the religious public charter school case, but the decision came down about three weeks after it was argued, and so we were able to not only preview it but also discuss the decision. And today we're going to discuss three more cases that we've been watching.
Liz Cavell: That's right. So if you recall the cases left to cover decisions in from the term are the Catholic Charities decision. We covered that one right after oral arguments took place. That was our April episode, and we also got a decision in Mahmoud versus Taylor just a few days, and that was the final case we were watching this term. Finally, we're going to talk about a case that doesn't involve direct religious liberty claims but is definitely religion adjacent and is very consequential in the LGBTQ legally sanctioned discrimination landscape. We covered that case back in January. It was argued early, so we're going to cover all three of those decisions that came down this summer. All very bad news for secular government, but very good news for Christians who really want to be privileged under the law.
Let's get into it.
Rebecca Markert: So the first case we're going to discuss is Catholic Charities versus Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission. This opinion was unanimous. Shocker. We did not predict this well. We kind of did though. Did we? Yeah, roll the tape. I'm kidding. We did. Well, so we said it was either going to be unanimous or it was a possibility of being unanimous, but we really kind of thought if it wasn't unanimous, it was going to be seven two.
Liz Cavell: That's true. The oral arguments definitely did not bode well. There was way too much sympathy for the Catholic Charities position. And just a reminder what that case was about, which was a challenge by Catholic Charities, a religious organization, but a sprawling secular charity umbrella. They were seeking a religious exemption from paying taxes into the state's unemployment compensation system, which they had done for decades, but now wanted to be exempt from.
Rebecca Markert: The decision was written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor and in the decision the court found that the denial of the exemption by the state of Wisconsin violated the federal constitution because the constitution does not allow for denominational preference. She wrote in the unanimous decision, it is fundamental to our constitutional order that the government maintain neutrality between religion and religion. There may be hard calls to make in policing that rule, but this is not one of them.
Liz Cavell: So if you remember or if you went back and to our episode covering Catholic charities and the oral arguments, I remember there was definitely a sort of a factual piece that was latched onto by a lot of the justices at oral arguments that the organization would be exempt if say they proselytized in the course of administering their charity. So if they prayed or forced people to pray before they got food at their soup kitchens or whatever, even though that's not the types of charities that were at issue in this case. And then there was another sort of hypothetical hay was made out of the fact that if they were the type of organization that only served co-religionists, so if they only served other Catholics in their charitable ministry, then that might be a fact that would support exemption under the statute because if you recall, the statutory language that grants religious exemption requires the charity to be operated primarily for religious purposes. And so this is the court determining what does primarily for religious purposes mean and deciding that the way the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed and determined the meaning of that statute discriminated between denominations in the way that they might administer or do their charitable work.
Rebecca Markert: Justice Sotomayor referred to this as textbook denominational discrimination. So actually the silver lining in this case is that it really is a strong affirmation of Establishment Clause principles and the cases that our organizations have been relying on pretty much since the summer of 2022 when it really did seem like with the shelving of the Lemon Test, it really seemed like the court was trying to abandon all of these principles undergirding the Establishment Clause. And in this unanimous decision by the Supreme Court, there is affirmation of a lot of the case law that proceeded Lemon. In this opinion, Justice Sotomayor really was able to reaffirm a lot of the case law and really highlighted a lot of the principles that our organizations have been using in a lot of our litigation ever since. And so in that sense, it was a good win for church state separation because we were getting quotes we use constantly in our briefing like this one. The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that the government may not officially prefer one religious denomination over another. This principle of denominational neutrality bars states from passing laws that aid or oppose particular religions or interfere in the competition between sects.
Liz Cavell: Right. And I think it's, we're no fans of this opinion, mostly because it imbues the Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion from below with a lot of these intentions and factual findings that really didn't exist in the case.
Rebecca Markert: Oh, for sure.
Liz Cavell: But what I will say is after listening to the oral arguments, and Rebecca and I talked about this and knowing how much support there was for the position that Catholic Charities is entitled to religious exemption under the statute, this is by far the narrowest possible decision that could have been handed down from the current Supreme Court. And so there's that kind of one small saving grace, which is that decision pretty narrowly just is confined to the fact that, okay, what the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled below is that a church run nonprofit that does secular charity work cannot get the exemption, but an identical nonprofit that does the same work but proselytizes or only serves co-religionists, they could receive the exemption. I don't know if that's a fair reading of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, but that is what the opinion says. Violates the Constitution is like that distinction. So other things that we heard being argued by Catholic charities and some of the more conservative justices at oral arguments like this idea that actually all the statutory definition of for religious purposes should look at is the motivations of the organization. Like if it's religiously motivated charity work than any organization that can say that would qualify for the exemption, those were not the arguments that won the day in this majority opinion. So the opinion was as narrowly written as it possibly could have been given that Catholic Charities was guaranteed to win at this court.
Rebecca Markert: And as we said at the outset, we were certain that Catholic Charities was going to win in this instance, especially before this court. To be clear, I think the impact of this case is going to be that we are going to see, as we have for a number of years now, an increased request for exemptions from laws, especially by Christian organizations and ones that could threaten workers' rights.
Liz Cavell: It just opens the door to these organizations claiming evermore exemptions from workplace protections, laws that protect employees minimum wage laws. There are religious exemptions in many laws that protect employees and that protect all of us in other contexts and expanding religious exemptions further and further just kind of threatens the whole system of secular laws that protect us all. And so this kind of goes in that direction and opens the door for more and more claimed exemptions. And then ultimately I think because of the narrowness of the decision litigation over what constitutes a theological choice by different religious nonprofits,
Rebecca Markert: Right, huge loss of protections for workers. There's no guarantee that this decision is just going to be limited to Wisconsin's law. It could be used in other states and for other issue areas we've talked about the threat that it could pose for people who work for religiously affiliated organizations like hospitals. That opens up a lot of questions that, as Liz just mentioned, are a ripe for litigation now, and we could see more and more increased religious exemptions in those spaces.
Liz Cavell: There were two concurrences in this unanimous opinion in favor of Catholic charities. One was written by Justice Thomas, who you won't be surprised to hear, would've ruled in favor of charities for a much broader reasoning and holding, which would embrace what was argued at oral arguments and in briefing as the church autonomy doctrine. Basically this very, very broad deference to churches in terms of how they operate, what their purposes are basically would've embraced. I think a reasoning that if the charitable works are religiously motivated, that's enough. We just defer to the church's autonomy.
Rebecca Markert: He basically talks a lot about how the religious institutions don't exist separately from the rest of the secular world and that they have to be able to form corporations, they have to be able to pay staff and enter into contracts, all that fun stuff, but that they also cannot just simply be treated as corporations because they're special and they deserve more.
Liz Cavell: Exactly.
Rebecca Markert: The entire theme of that concurrence is religious institutions should be able to have their cake and eat it too.
Liz Cavell: Yes.
Rebecca Markert: The same thing we've heard a thousand times before by this court. Exactly.
Liz Cavell: A maximalist like church, autonomy, deference, and also they can have all the things and none of the restrictions.
But what I thought was a helpful formulation was the way that Justice Jackson explained her analysis, and granted this was not like the formulation adopted by the court, but the way she expressed it is that this whole case centered around Wisconsin statutory language exemptions in the state statutes that lay out the unemployment compensation tax system and there is a virtually identical language law at the federal level, and she talked a lot about that at oral arguments. And so she was sort of zeroing in on the statutory language, operated primarily for religious purposes. What does that mean under the law? She was trying to get this point across at oral arguments, which is that this language is meant to refer to and be interpreted or applied by states as what the organization's function is not its inspiration or even the way it does its work. And so the way she said it is put differently. The law turns on what an entity does, not how or why it does it.
What does it do if that's not religious? So food service serving food to the poor, housing orphans doing vocational rehabilitation like the organizations at issue in the case, if the thing is not religious that it then that's not what's meant by operated primarily for religious purposes and it remains to be seen if the court's majority ruling will be implemented that narrowly. But I like to think of that as the correct formulation for the court's opinion, which is if we're going to all borrow the fiction that Wisconsin relied on this, they didn't proselytize and they didn't do these other things that amount to religious purposes, that's the how. Then they improperly sort of weighed into questions of how it does its work and discriminated in that way along theological lines. But all that states need to look at is what the entity does and that should guide who gets the exemption. So it remains to be seen.
Rebecca Markert: Yeah, it's great guidance and we have seen in other circumstances a concurring opinion if it lays out a test or some sort of formulation that lower courts may adopt it. So it does remain to be seen. The biggest example of that is of course, justice O'Connor's endorsement test from the eighties that was in a concurring opinion and became a test that a lot of the lower courts eventually did adopt. So we'll see what happens with this. Again, certainly not the end of litigation. We know that the Christian nationalist agenda is also to increase these exemptions, and so we are probably going to see more of those across the country.
Liz Cavell: Yep. Okay. Well that was the best case scenario for what we could have or would've expected for a decision in favor of Catholic charities. The narrowness, I hate the unanimity because it gives the patina of legitimacy to the Supreme Court, which we all know is a joke, but I do think it was the narrowest decision we could have hoped for. So there's that. Yeah. Alright, let's move on to Mahmoud versus Taylor.
Rebecca Markert: Now, this case was about a challenge by a group of parents who were seeking a religious exemption for their elementary school aged kids reading and learning about LGBTQ plus inclusive storybooks. The school board in Montgomery County, Maryland originally allowed families to opt out of any curriculum that involved those storybooks, but the board eventually stopped the practice because they could not accommodate the growing number of opt-out requests. It became an unworkable system. Again, we talked about this at length in a previous episode. Both of the lower courts, including the fourth circuit, ordered a denial of the preliminary injunction due to the parents' broad claims and scant record. This case went up to the Supreme Court on a preliminary injunction.
Liz Cavell: So just a quick refresher from our chat about oral arguments and the background on this case, which is this case involved books that were approved by the school board for use in the English language arts curriculum. These are books that would be used or just even made available for other English and language arts activities. So like free reading, classroom reading, a handful out of many books that are age appropriate books that are approved for kids to read and use in the course of language arts learning. So these aren't textbooks. If you remember, we kind of pulled out a few examples that were cited at oral arguments and some very horrifying examples of the conservative justices grappling with the existence of leather and drag queens pride puppy, like a literal board book that's an A, B, C things you would see at a parade, a book about the niece whose uncle is getting married and she's anxious because it means she'll get less time to spend with her uncle and her uncle happens to be marrying another man and that's not what the story is about, but because it's presented without negative commentary, Justice Alito was very triggered by that.
And guess who wrote the opinion?
Rebecca Markert: It was Justice Alito! Our favorite.
Liz Cavell: Yep. So I think it's fair to say this was the opinion we expected, but it's every bit as awful as we feared in terms of what this decision had the potential to do both to just public school curriculum and to LGBTQ inclusiveness in public schools. So let's talk about the opinion.
Rebecca Markert: It was a six to three decision written by Justice Alito with Sotomayor dissenting with Kagan and Jackson. This was a case that was released on the very last day of the court term and like Liz mentioned, just as horrific as we thought it was going to be, the court found that the school board's refusal to allow the parents to opt out of this curriculum violates their constitutional right to free exercise of religion. He acknowledged in the opinion that what the parents seek here is not the right to micromanage the public school curriculum, but rather have their children opt out and that burdens their right to direct the religious upbringing of their children under the First Amendment. This is a direct quote from a decision, a previous decision by the US Supreme Court, Wisconsin versus Yoder. It's heavily relied on in this opinion, and as we mentioned in the preview of this case, this was a case in which the court held that the state compulsory school attendance law violated the free exercise clause as applied to the Amish community to show the religious burden.
Liz Cavell: If you recall at oral arguments, I believe it was Justice Alito who asked, and the attorney arguing for the parents said, actually what's happening in Maryland is worse than what the state was doing in Yoder.
Rebecca Markert: Yes, yes. And of course it's one of these, this is a quote that we've used ad nauseum in legal briefs and in talking about the Establishment Clause and religious liberty principles overall, because as parents you do have the right to bring up your children in any religion or no faith at all that you would like, but there is a perversion of the use of this language in this particular
Liz Cavell: Totally it is definitely a case of you get that language out of your mouth, Justice Alito, that is not for you. It's like a trolling using these robust Establishment Clause principles in the Yoder case and that has been cited repeatedly in the line of cases that Justice Alito has zero respect for. That upholds the Establishment Clause and turning that into some principle for why LGBTQ inclusive themes can't be taught in public schools or should always have to include an opt-out provision because to not do so I guess would be the real Establishment Clause violation, right? It's like secular topics that violate somebody's warped or just extremely discriminatory religious beliefs somehow is the only threat to the Establishment Clause that can be found in the public schools. It's perverse. I want to say a couple of things just as a reminder from our preview and our coverage of the background of the case, which is that it has to be said that this court is eagerly doing these things.
There was no need and really no basis in the case below to reach this broad sweeping opinion that's going to impose these substantial new burdens on public schools. Because if you remember Rebecca and I discussing this, as we repeatedly said in our discussion of the case below, the record in this case was extremely undeveloped. This case was not in a procedural posture where the factual record was developed to be able for the lower courts to even judge whether or not the constitution was violated by the public school district. All that was done was that the board approved a few books with LGBTQ characters for use in their public schools. There was no information in the record yet about how teachers or employees or individual schools was using any individual storybooks or how often books were being used by which children, which grades what any individual children had been taught in conjunction with their use, what conversations had ensued, none of that. So this big sweeping ruling that fundamentally changes the burden on public schools in terms of managing their curriculum is coming from a case that in no way demanded the court to do this. The court is going out of its way. It is like impatient to make this ruling. It wants to do this, it wants to step into this culture war and make a big sweeping change to public schools.
Rebecca Markert: This is an underhanded attempt at a book ban. I mean the practical impact of this decision is that Montgomery County schools are probably just going to pull these books and in fact have to do that while the case is remanded back to the lower courts because again, like Liz mentioned, it's in a procedural posture of being at a preliminary injunction stage. And so now the court as reversed and allowed a preliminary injunction to stand, which means that the school is blocked from having the curriculum unless it has opt-outs. So until the case is resolved, opt-outs must be afforded to the parents and as noted Montgomery County has already said, it's an unworkable system. There's no way that they can do it. So the easiest solution then in this case is to pull the books from the shelves.
Liz Cavell: Right? I said this in our earlier episode on Mahmoud, and we'll give credit again to Ian Millhauser who framed it this way, but I think it's really helpful. It is imposing a don't say gay regime on all American public schools because like Florida adopted anything that any books or materials that have LGBTQ, even characters, these are not books that send the book Pride Puppy and Uncle Bobby's wedding. These books did not center on same sex relationships. They just had LGBTQ characters or just in the case of Pride puppy, Abe literal Pride parade that just existed in the world of the book. That's it. And so it's not clear from the Mahmoud decision how and when the book would've crossed the line because again, we don't have any factual development on that. Just the fact that there weren't opt-outs was enough to be this sweeping constitutional violation.
So obviously the message to schools is, listen, if you don't want to be in this morass of litigation and parental opt-outs, you need to just exclude any books like this from your curriculum completely. And that is the whole kind of don't say gay regime, it's mass confusion about what's legal and what's not. And the net result is to just chill all speech or ideas or thought or acceptance of or celebration of anything related to LGBTQ themes. And it's again, something totally unnecessary and not demanded at all by the situation arising out of Montgomery County. This is something that the Supreme Court was eager to do.
Rebecca Markert: Well, and then Justice Thomas had another concurring opinion.
Liz Cavell: Yep. It's important that he gets his 2 cents in.
Rebecca Markert: So the CliffNotes version of his concurrence is basically that the justification for this policy being equity and inclusion, those aren't important interests to justify the policy. Basically religion is more important than equity and inclusion.
Liz Cavell: Yes, exactly. It's this total inversion of the First Amendment to say that free exercise rights trump everything and the state's interests to overcome the prevailing interest on the free exercise side, good luck with coming up with the state interest that's good enough to prevail over a free exercise interest of a religiously conservative parent and get out of here with that inclusivity rationale because that is not a substantial state interest
Rebecca Markert: And it just goes against why we have public schools in the first place, bringing together students and children from all walks of life and putting them into an environment where they can learn from each other and experience those diverse viewpoints and perspectives so that we can all live together. But Justice Thomas in his infinite wisdom said this, if the court were to accept the board's argument, we would effectively give schools a playbook for evading the First Amendment.
Liz Cavell: It's literally the opposite of what is truly happening and gaslighting to the Nth degree. And it's important in my rant about how none of this is necessitated by the case below. This is just the court literally forcing this result on the country because it's impatient to get to this place that it wants to be. They're finding that just on the bare facts below is enough to say just like Yoder, that the state has so discriminated against these parents that are seeking to opt out of these books that we have to review this with strict scrutiny. Right. This is the whole discussion of Justice Thomas around burdens and state interests. It's saying literally just by exposing students to LGBTQ characters, I guess in books, that's enough to trigger strict scrutiny from the courts and make every school justify that curricular decision with the highest level of state interest, which apparently doesn't include teaching inclusivity at all of our kids. So frustrating about it. It's shoehorning this really extreme ideology of the court into this system of judicial review that we have to genuinely test state action that genuinely violates people's rights and just perverting it beyond all recognition. And that basically sums up Justice Sotomayor's Dissent, which of course was joined by the other two non-conservative Justices, Kagan and Jackson.
Rebecca Markert: Well, I just want to read some more quotes from the dissenting opinion because Sotomayor just does such a wonderful job of dissenting and really again, getting to the heart of it, which is just this deep sadness in what is happening here. And she talks a little bit about the function of public schools and the whole idea behind a common school system and bringing these children together to learn to live, even though they may be from differing faiths, differing sexualities, differing races. She says that decision guts are free exercise precedent and strikes at the core premise of public schools that children may come together to learn not the teachings of a particular faith, but a range of concepts and views that reflect our entire society. Exposure to new ideas has always been a vital part of that project until now. She continues, the reverberations of the court's error will be felt. I fear for generations unable to condone that grave misjudgment I Dissent.
Liz Cavell: Yeah, it's really sad because again, totally unnecessary and unwarranted by the actual legal conflicts that exist or anywhere. This is a solution in search of a problem. This doesn't solve any problem, it's just that the court thrusting itself into public schools to put its fist on the scale of a culture war that exists within far right religious conservative circles and say, we think that teaching multiculturalism, pluralism, acceptance, inclusivity is hostile to a specific little segment of the religious population of this country, and therefore we're going to force every public school in America to revolve around our view, our traditional religious views instead of letting public schools be a place where kids are prepared to be part of a pluralistic society. It's awful.
Rebecca Markert: This ruling allows for parents then to opt out seemingly of any curriculum story or class that would burden a parent's right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. And so this of course is going to bring up more litigation and more requests for opt-outs. We have no idea what those will eventually look like, but we kind of have some idea as to what religious parents will want to opt out of next. Most notably, I think for our organizations is the teaching of evolution.
Liz Cavell: Right. And Justice Sotomayor's descent points this out as well, which is what is the principled boundary of this decision in terms of the burdens that public schools now have to take on when religious parents object to something being taught? Obviously what the court has in mind is LGBTQ acceptance in public school curriculum, but how does the principle in this case not equally extend to, and Justice Sotomayor specifically calls out teaching on evolution the work of female scientists like Marie Curie or the history of vaccines. You could see obviously this analysis being extended to give uber conservative parents, religious parents the right to opt out or control all kinds of different aspects of a public school curriculum that conflict with their religious views. So just the potential burden on public schools and just harm to public education and just the ability of public schools to develop curriculum based on, again, these holistic pluralistic goals is just totally undermined and thrown into chaos.
Rebecca Markert: And you're going to get schools that are just going to forego teaching them because the situation in Montgomery County where the opt-outs just became unworkable, and so instead of having that system of opt-outs, the easiest solution might just be to stop teaching it at all, and that is to the detriment of our students and is an incredible threat to the public education system, which again is the point.
Liz Cavell: Right, exactly. This is part of a multi-front approach to totally destroying, undermining, hollowing out public schools and privatizing ultimately education in this country.
Rebecca Markert: One of the things that we brought up in our amicus brief before the Supreme Court was the stigmatization of LGBTQ plus students themselves in so many different ways, including not seeing themselves represented in books that are part of the curriculum in their schools and being part of the divisiveness that comes from parents objecting on religious grounds and the students who may identify with that community feeling othered in some sort of way. This decision is just going to obviously further that stigmatization and it feels like so frustrating that we're in a moment where we have to say representation matters and it still matters and these kids are not going to have that anymore. It's frustrating and disheartening AU has a youth organizing fellowship and we have different fellows every summer. One of our fellows wrote a blog in the aftermath of this decision, and I just wanted to quote from it because he really talks about just the impact that it's going to have on the queer children in our public schools and really highlights why it's so important to have these books on the shelves. This is a quote from the blog of Perth Joshie. He writes, when I was younger, I never heard queer stories in school with my only role models being heterosexual, cisgender people. I felt like queerness was an extra terrestrial concept. If you grow up only hearing about a certain kind of people and relationship, when any thought of yours differs from that, it feels impossible.
Liz Cavell: That really kind of strikes at the heart of what's going on here. It's the backlash that is just totally embodied in the ideology of this court, this backlash to just acceptance of this non-normative heterosexual cisgender America and that we have to go back to a time where kids never heard about these things in public school and everything has to go back in the closet because the fact that our culture as embodied in our public school curriculum has swung towards open acceptance and even celebration of these different ways of existing that violates my religious rights and it's just sad. And that really captures what the impact will ultimately be on students.
Rebecca Markert: And I worry for increased bullying and things like that in these schools. It's just grownups condoning that. So on that note, let's turn to another disheartening decision. United States versus Skrmetti.
Liz Cavell: Yeah. Well, this one we should give a little background since we talked about it so very long ago in January, and the court heard arguments I think in December. This was a case that involved Tennessee's law banning gender affirming care of any kind for minors under the age of 18, and as one of the strictest gender affirming care bans in the country, and one that specifically or explicitly stated the purpose of the law was to ensure that young people do not depart from their sex assigned at birth. Basically had that language of the purpose is to encourage minors to appreciate their sex or prevent young people from being disdainful of their sex. So in other words, it was seen as one of the strictest laws in the country banning gender affirming care and one of the most explicit sex-based classifications under the law, which is supposed to get heightened scrutiny by the court. As we just heard, the court is so preoccupied with giving heightened scrutiny to these governmental overreaches and discriminatory classifications. But lo and behold, that did not rule the day inti
Rebecca Markert: Well because the majority was again, a six three decision written by our dear Chief Justice Roberts with Sotomayor dissenting again with Justice Jackson and Kagan in part, and Kagan also had a separate Dissent, but they basically said that this law had nothing to do with sex. It was based on age and your medical diagnosis, and therefore it was not necessary to have it be evaluated under any sort of heightened scrutiny under the 14th Amendment. Instead, it satisfies the lowest level of scrutiny, which is rational basis.
Liz Cavell: This opinion was just stupid, not well reasoned. Again, it totally reveals the court reverse engineering it's results, results-driven analysis like the court again, did not have to reach this really bad ideological results, but somehow had to get to the result that gender affirming care bans are okay. And so you get all this terribly bad legal reasoning like this isn't a sex-based classification or it's not even classifying people on the basis of their transgender status. It's just classifying people based on whether they have gender
Rebecca Markert: Dysphoria.
Liz Cavell: It's like that is bad logic and you can see the reverse engineering going on in the opinion and the court just being so eager to reach these conclusions that are making this constitutional order of social conservatism. It's really frustrating.
Rebecca Markert: And the term sex is all over this bill.
Liz Cavell: Totally.
Rebecca Markert: I think it's written 17 or so times, so it really is just gymnastics getting here.
Liz Cavell: Again, the court didn't reach this in the case, but it reminds me of the Masterpiece cake shop arguments of, well, someone refusing to make a wedding cake for a same sex couple is not discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. They don't bake same sex wedding cakes for anybody, even straight people that come in wanting that good or service. It's like too cute by half. I don't like it. It's actually not smart and it's not logically coherent, but here we are with six justices on our Supreme Court embracing this sly sort of approach to what makes something a sex-based classification. And what's really stupid is that literally all of these gimmicks were argued in the civil rights era on the basis of race and the courts then were principled and strong enough to smack down that kind of bs. But this court is just here to lap it up.
Rebecca Markert: Yeah, it's horrifying. And also the fact that they can't see the similarities is horrifying.
Liz Cavell: Yeah, it's really, really bad. But we should just get a little layout of as best we can with not principled decision. What the court decided because the Tennessee law banning gender affirming care was being challenged under the equal protection clause. And believe it or not, the US Supreme Court has a whole body of law from decades of precedent establishing equal protection clause analysis and how you analyze an equal protection claim and when heightened or strict scrutiny is triggered and how you do that analysis. And so like Rebecca already said, and we're kind of alluding to Justice Roberts just sort of totally sidestep the whole problem of having to do any type of heightened judicial review of the gender affirming care ban by just totally sticking his head in the sand and saying, actually, these laws don't do any type of sex-based classification. They don't even discriminate on the basis of transgender status. We don't even need to do any kind of heightened review. Basically, this isn't even an equal protection clause problem because there's no suspect classification in the law, which is what the court has traditionally used to trigger heightened scrutiny is the law making classifications based on the suspect classes like race, sex and what was argued in this case and an oral argument as transgender status should be included as a suspect class Roberts didn't even bother rejecting that because he wouldn't even find that the law discriminates on the basis of trans status.
Rebecca Markert: And because it didn't, then they employ the rational basis review, which is an extremely deferential review. It basically says that the court can defer to the state of Tennessee's legislative findings that these certain medical treatments for gender dysphoria carry adverse risks and that minors lack the authority to understand what they're undertaking and later might express regret. And the state also determined that these care treatments are experimental and they have unknown long-term effects and that gender dysphoria can instead be resolved through less invasive approaches. And so all of those findings, whether they're true or not, whether they're based medical science or not under rational basis review, are afforded a high degree of deference. And so the law stands,
Liz Cavell: Yeah, there were several concurring opinions here just to basically state all the individual ways in which different justices would be awful. Thomas had his own concurring opinion. Barrett wrote a concurring opinion, and I think Alito wrote a concurring opinion basically that would've gone farther on whether or not transgender individuals would constitute a suspect class. I think Barrett and Alito wrote separately to give their view on that. And then Thomas wrote separately to specifically call out the Bostock decision, which was the court interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the language which also prohibits sex-based discrimination. And the court held that applied to sexual orientation and he basically concurred to write that decision shouldn't apply to the equal protection context. So he wanted to make that clear.
Rebecca Markert: And the author of that decision, Bostock versus Clayton County was Justice Gorsuch, who was very quiet during the oral arguments on this case, Skrmetti, and also was quiet in the drafting of any sort of opinion, joined the majority, but there's no concurring opinion expounding on his thoughts about how this conflicts or does not conflict with Sach. Yeah, I'm sure he's a principled guy. Right. So the dissenting opinion, obviously Sotomayor writes another fiery dissent arguing that the law does actually classify on the basis of sex because it did. But she says because it allows certain medical treatments based on whether they're inconsistent with a minor sex and because sex determines access to the covered medications, it's clearly a sex classification. But she writes, yet, the majority refuses to call a spade a spade,
Liz Cavell: Which is totally fair. That's what this opinion does. It just basically totally ignores the actual classification that the law is doing and then uses that kind of head in the sand approach to do a completely lax rational basis review of the law and just say basically, states can do whatever they want in this space because we're not going to find that these laws trigger heightened scrutiny. I think it's the fact that the majority opinion didn't reach the conclusion that Barrett and Alito wanted to reach, which is that transgender status is not a suspect classification. I find it interesting that Roberts chose not to reach that and just pretend like the law doesn't classify on that basis. I guess that's no real victory for future litigation, equal protection litigation, but at least it leaves open like a future argument that trans status should be treated as a suspect classification.
But again, if this law doesn't classify on that basis, then it's hard to see a law that you could still make that argument on an equal protection basis because the court's just going to pretend that these laws, they don't classify on the basis of transness. They just classify on the basis of gender dysphoria. It's like the old, oh, we're not pregnancy discrimination isn't against women, it's just against pregnancy. So it's fine. It's sex-based, just a medical diagnosis. There's only one group of people that experiences this thing that you're choosing to focus on, and it is trans people, but I guess including trans status as a suspect, classification is the one thing that lives to die another day. But I don't have very high hopes for this court ever being the place where that gets any kind of equal protection under the law.
Rebecca Markert: Well, I'm still reeling from Justice Barrett during the oral argument in this case, wondering if there is even a history of discrimination or harassment against the trans community. What?
Liz Cavell: Her big point, and this featured in her opinion, so I guess she wasn't convinced, is that it's private discrimination is not enough. It's not enough that the whole population has discriminated against you. It has to be discrimination under the law, which was pointed out to her by, I think Chase STR at oral arguments. They're trans bans in the military and other bans on trans cross-dressing laws. All these things were discrimination under the law that existed for decades if not millennia against trans people. And she was like, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. But besides that, nothing else. And it's like that featured in her analysis of why in her opinion, trans status is not a suspect class because there's not enough evidence of prior de jour under the law discrimination.
Rebecca Markert: And Sotomayor does call this out in her Dissent as well. She takes this head on. She writes, as transgender people have long been subject to discrimination in healthcare, employment and housing and to rampant harassment and physical violence. And she noted that the federal has started to expel transgender service members from the military and is also threatening to withdraw funding from schools and nonprofits that espouse any support for transgender individuals.
Liz Cavell: Right. Again, not only is there a history of discrimination under the law against trans people, there currently is discrimination under the law. The current administration, which is the law, the government is currently actively discriminating against this community left and right and center. And so it's just another call out by Justice Sotomayor of like, are you kidding me that this is not a suspect or quasi suspect class under the equal protection clause?
Rebecca Markert: The impact of this opinion is huge. More than half the states, 27 states have bans on gender affirming care on the books. I think only 25 are the ones that would be affected by this. There are two that are under court challenge, and I think at least one, maybe both. I, sorry, I didn't look that up before we got in here today, but the legal challenge is under the state constitution, but over half of the states have these bans already in effect, it's obviously only going to embolden other states that would want to put this into effect as well.
Liz Cavell: And again, this is a gender affirming care ban on minors, but there's no principled reason why the same arguments would not apply to gender affirming care bans on adults. We shall see about whether or not such a law would survive rational basis review. But I mean, I'm pretty skeptical that this court would find any principled reason to limit this to type of care ban on minors. So again, this is a disaster for transgender people, especially transgender youth and just further balkanization of medical care for certain populations in our country the same way that Dobbs has done for access to reproductive healthcare. So it's bad.
Rebecca Markert: Again, because all I'm going to do is quote Sotomayor today. Apparently she writes that in the conclusion of her dissenting opinion, which I think again just really brings home the sadness and the harm that is going to result from this. She writes, it also authorizes without second thought, untold harm to transgender children and the parents and families who love them.
Liz Cavell: That's a great place to leave it probably for Skrmetti. So we'll see what farther damage the court can do to some of these topics in its next term. Right. The term is over finally, and we can all just now wait until the fall to find what fresh new hell awaits us.
Rebecca Markert: We can't wait. We can't wait. We can wait. But I was going to say we already know that the fall is going to show us some fresh new hell because the court has been granting cases for review during this last term that they're going to hear in the fall. We know that the ban on conversion therapy out of Colorado is going to be before the court this fall.
Liz Cavell: Which is so funny having just talked about Skrmetti. Right. I wonder what they're going to say about conversion therapy, which is just a fancy term for trying to convince gay and trans kids that actually they're straight and cis. It is a form of religious counseling usually that seeks to convert gay kids to being straight. It's a very old form of basically child abuse that does not work and is actively harmful. And religious counselors, I guess, and clergy people, and I guess secular credentialed counselors that want to still do this type of harmful therapy to kids, they have been suing in places where this type of thing is banned and it's banned by states and municipalities because it's been shown to be harmful. And then we have religionists that Sue saying, you violate my free exercise and speech rights because I can't do my harm to people with my conversion therapy. So the court's got to weigh in on that.
Rebecca Markert: There's another case that's not quite a religious liberty case, but I wanted to bring it up again because we've talked about crisis pregnancy centers on the show before. The court has accepted a case involving a crisis pregnancy center. It's a fraud and consumer protection case, but because most of the CPCs are run by religious organization, it's something that we're going to take a look at and see if there's any reason for our organizations to get involved at the Supreme Court level. And then there are a lot of petitions for review up at the Supreme Court known as the cert stage. Cambridge Christian out of Florida is also at the cert stage before the Supreme Court, and that is a significant one because they're asking the court to overturn the Santa Fe decision from the early two thousands, which involves school prayer. So they haven't accepted it yet, and hopefully they won't. But it is just another example of these other religious outfits that are trying to get these cases before this court because as this last term demonstrates, the court is eager to take these types of cases. Totally.
Liz Cavell: Okay. I have two thoughts slash rants.
On the upcoming term. What we know so far. Rebecca covered it very well so far. What we are watching, and there will be more to come unfortunately, but one on the crisis pregnancy center fraud consumer protection case. I know I'm going to, and I encourage our listeners to go back and listen to our episode where we interviewed and talked to Jennifer McKenna. She is one of the leading experts on the crisis pregnancy center investigations and multi-state surveys of how these organizations operate, and they do untold harm and they kind of house a lot of money. It's like a billion dollar religion adjacent industry. And she talked a lot about some of these challenges that were sort of working their ways through the courts and different legal ways at getting at CPCs. And so I know I'm going to go back and listen to that episode. It was from November of last year.
Rebecca Markert: Also, let me just interject quickly. She worked, I'm not exactly sure what her role was, but anyway, she had mentioned to me that there is a documentary that is available on streaming services called Preconceived, which talks again at length about the CPC industry. So if you haven't seen it and you're thinking, what should I watch this summer? Here's a recommendation from your We Dissent host.
Liz Cavell: Yes. And she talked about that too when we talked to her back in November. She was amazing. She's so knowledgeable, and this is such a sleeping giant in terms of a part of the conservative Christian nationalist slash anti-abortion movement that is doing untold harm with billions of dollars. And so that'd be a good listen just to get you in the mood for the fall term before it starts. And then on the Cambridge Christian Case, can we just say they're the biggest whiny babies that ever existed? They have been whining about this case for how many years that we've been working in this movement. This all originated with Cambridge Christian Academy, not being able to say a prayer over the loudspeaker at a multi-school athletic competition hosted by a government entity. I forget what it's called, but it's like a conference. It's like the Florida School Conference of Athletics.
It's a governmental entity that hosts these conference wide sports tournaments. Right. And Cambridge Christian is a private Christian school that participates in this sports consortium that includes a ton of public schools and is hosted by a government entity. They're not allowed to take over the PA system and foist their pre-game prayers on everybody, including public schools using a governmental machinery. And they sued, this had to be at least 10 years ago that they sued and they're still suing and suing and suing and losing and pushing. And now they're like, Supreme Court, take our case. And it's so infuriating that they have a not outside chance of getting the Supreme Court to take their loser of a whiny baby case and say, actually their religious rights have been violated from 10 years of being prohibited from saying their prayers over a loudspeaker instead of just to themselves and their own team at these statewide athletic competitions. It's very stupid.
Rebecca Markert: Yes, yes. So that's what we have to look forward to. Are you done with your rant, Liz? Yes, I'm, we will save space for further rants this if this case is granted review by the Supreme Court, but hopefully it will not. In the meantime, we will be taking a break from our Supreme Court previews and reviews of decisions. And Liz, I just want to say Happy Birthday friend.
Liz Cavell: Happy Birthday to you friend.
Rebecca Markert: I will just end this on a cheerier note and then we can go to the beach or something. But I really just appreciate that you were born into this world and you are fighting on the right side of history. So thank you so much for being here babe.
Liz Cavell: And July. You know what? July 1st marks the end of Supreme Court opinions. It marks our birthday month. It's a happy time when we can get a break from our terrible ideological social conservative Supreme Court. So here
Rebecca Markert: It's a little hard to celebrate the fourth this year, but I will enjoy a Popsicle and watermelon. I am going to watch Hamilton, which is what I love to do on the 4th of July. So that's it for today's episode. I'm Rebecca Markert.
Liz Cavell: And I'm Liz Cavell. And if you haven't already, please follow us on our socials, Facebook, Instagram, Bluesky, X. And also, if you love the show, it's great to leave a review and don't forget to tell your friends and family to check us out. Recommendations to new listeners is always the best review we can get. You can also check us out at our website we-dissent.org. Thanks for listening.
Rebecca Markert: We Dissent is a joint production of the Freedom From Religion, Foundation, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State. It is hosted by attorneys Liz Cavell and me, Rebecca Markert. Other production support comes from Greta Martens, audio engineering provided by Audio for the Arts based in Madison, Wisconsin. Special thanks to FFRF Summer intern Zoe Gunderson for her assistance in producing this episode. Thanks for listening.
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